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Abstract	  	   A	  number	  of	  theories	  posit	  various	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  factors	  as	  the	  central	  drivers	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  intelligence.	  Cognitive	  skills,	  such	  as	  transitive	  interference,	  that	  have	  important	  implications	  in	  both	  the	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  domains	  can	  help	  identify	  drivers	  of	  cognitive	  evolution.	  	  Transitive	  inference	  is	  an	  inferential	  reasoning	  skill,	  which	  allows	  individuals	  to	  deduce	  unknown	  relationships	  from	  known	  ones.	  	  Due	  to	  its	  importance	  in	  both	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  contexts	  it	  can	  provide	  a	  powerful	  test	  of	  the	  driving	  forces	  behind	  primate	  cognitive	  evolution.	  	  We	  compared	  chimpanzees’	  (Pan	  troglodytes)	  performance	  on	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  versions	  of	  a	  transitive	  inference	  task	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  whether	  they	  are	  better	  adapted	  to	  apply	  transitive	  reasoning	  to	  social	  or	  nonsocial	  stimuli.	  	  Our	  preliminary	  findings	  provide	  partial	  support	  for	  the	  hypotheses	  that	  chimpanzees	  are	  better	  adapted	  to	  use	  transitive	  inference	  in	  the	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  domains.	  However,	  our	  statistical	  abilities	  are	  limited	  by	  a	  small	  sample	  size	  and	  several	  confounding	  factors	  regarding	  the	  age	  and	  sex	  of	  our	  subjects,	  which	  limit	  firm	  conclusions.	  	  Further	  research	  (outlined	  in	  our	  methods)	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  more	  accurately	  asses	  the	  factors	  associated	  with	  the	  evolution	  of	  transitive	  inference	  skills	  in	  chimpanzees.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Introduction	  	  	   One	  of	  the	  greatest	  challenges	  facing	  evolutionary	  anthropologists	  today	  is	  determining	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  the	  evolution	  of	  intelligence.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  debate	  so	  far	  has	  centered	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  versus	  nonsocial	  factors.	  	  The	  evolutionary	  correlates	  of	  certain	  behaviors	  are	  especially	  difficult	  to	  determine	  for	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aspects	  of	  general	  intelligence,	  which	  clearly	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  both	  the	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  domain.	  	  Tinbergen	  (1963)	  argued	  that	  before	  a	  behavior	  could	  be	  fully	  understood	  four	  central	  questions	  had	  to	  be	  answered.	  	  These	  questions	  concerned	  the	  behavior’s	  proximate	  causes	  –	  mechanism	  and	  ontogeny	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  its	  ultimate	  causes	  –	  function	  and	  phylogeny.	  	  Although	  progress	  has	  been	  made	  in	  addressing	  these	  questions	  for	  certain	  adapted	  behaviors,	  determining	  the	  evolutionary	  causes	  of	  others	  remains	  challenging.	  	  Throughout	  the	  literature	  there	  is	  no	  consensus	  as	  to	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  social	  factors	  such	  as	  group	  size	  versus	  nonsocial	  factors	  such	  as	  diet	  in	  driving	  cognitive	  evolution	  (Holekamp	  2006;	  MacLean	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  The	  present	  study	  seeks	  to	  inform	  this	  debate	  by	  examining	  the	  role	  of	  group	  living	  and	  other	  selective	  pressures	  in	  shaping	  inferential	  reasoning	  skills,	  specifically	  transitive	  inference,	  in	  chimpanzees	  (Pan	  troglodytes)	  by	  comparing	  their	  performance	  on	  a	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  version	  of	  a	  transitive	  inference	  task.	   	  	   A	  number	  of	  hypotheses	  have	  been	  proposed	  to	  explain	  the	  evolution	  of	  cognition.	  These	  hypotheses	  fall	  largely	  into	  two	  categories,	  those	  that	  posit	  social	  factors	  and	  those	  that	  posit	  nonsocial	  factors	  as	  the	  primary	  driving	  force	  of	  cognitive	  evolution.	  	  The	  social	  hypotheses	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  factors	  in	  the	  cognitive	  evolution	  of	  primates	  (Bryne	  &	  Whiten	  1997).	  	  These	  center	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  primates	  evolved	  in	  response	  to	  complex	  problems	  associated	  with	  group	  living	  and	  that	  social	  intelligence	  proceeded	  nonsocial	  intelligence	  (Bryne	  &	  Whiten	  1997).	  	  Specifically,	  the	  social	  intelligence	  hypothesis	  states	  that	  primate	  cognition	  evolved	  primarily	  in	  response	  to	  the	  complex	  demands	  associated	  with	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group	  living	  (Bryne	  &	  Whiten	  1989).	  	  In	  contrast	  nonsocial	  hypotheses	  rest	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  either	  general	  intelligence	  or	  other	  factors	  such	  as	  ecology	  in	  allowing	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  intelligence	  (Milton	  1981).	  	  
Nonsocial	  hypotheses	  	  	   Ecological	  intelligence	  hypotheses	  suggest	  that	  foraging	  challenges	  drove	  the	  evolution	  of	  cognition.	  	  An	  individual’s	  ability	  to	  remember	  locations	  and	  phenological	  distributions	  of	  resources	  are	  believed	  to	  be	  related	  to	  foraging	  success	  and	  therefore	  ultimately	  reproductive	  success	  (Erhart	  &	  Overdorff	  2006).	  	  Milton	  (1981)	  hypothesized	  that	  finding	  spatially	  and	  temporally	  scattered	  food	  sources	  posed	  major	  cognitive	  challenges	  for	  memory	  and	  spatial	  representation	  and	  have	  therefore	  been	  a	  major	  force	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  primate	  intelligence.	  	  In	  lemurs	  significant	  correlations	  between	  relative	  brain	  size	  and	  diet	  and	  activity	  pattern	  support	  Milton’s	  conjecture	  (MacLean	  et	  al.	  2009).	  	  There	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  challenges	  associated	  with	  frugivory	  compared	  with	  folivory	  as	  it	  requires	  individuals	  to	  remember	  the	  spatial	  locations	  of	  fruiting	  trees	  as	  well	  as	  the	  timing	  of	  fruiting	  and	  ripening.	  	  In	  contrast	  folivory	  is	  relatively	  simpler	  as	  leaves	  tend	  to	  be	  ubiquitous	  although	  Milton	  (1984)	  notes	  that	  plants	  do	  put	  forth	  both	  physical	  and	  chemical	  defenses	  in	  response	  to	  predation.	  	  Aeillo	  and	  Wheeler	  (1995)	  added	  additional	  caveats	  to	  this	  theory	  by	  putting	  forth	  the	  Expensive-­‐Tissue	  hypothesis,	  which	  states	  that	  because	  brain	  tissue	  is	  metabolically	  costly	  increases	  in	  brain	  size	  have	  to	  be	  offset	  by	  either	  a	  reduction	  in	  gut	  size	  or	  a	  shift	  to	  a	  higher	  quality	  diet.	  	  Therefore	  they	  posit	  that	  regardless	  of	  what	  drove	  the	  evolution	  of	  primate	  cognition	  it	  would	  not	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  increasing	  diet	  quality.	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Furthermore	  Holekamp	  (2006)	  points	  out	  what	  he	  believes	  are	  a	  number	  of	  inconsistencies	  and	  phenomena	  that	  aren’t	  predicted	  by	  social	  intelligence	  hypotheses.	  	  For	  example	  throughout	  evolutionary	  time	  there	  is	  a	  covariation	  between	  increases	  in	  brain	  volume	  in	  ungulates	  and	  increases	  in	  brain	  volume	  in	  carnivores,	  which	  is	  expected	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  “evolutionary	  arms	  race”.	  	  However	  these	  brain	  volume	  increases	  occurred	  both	  in	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  carnivores,	  which	  the	  social	  intelligence	  hypothesis	  doesn’t	  predict	  (Holekamp	  2006).	  	  Reader	  and	  Laland	  (2002)	  also	  found	  that	  social	  group	  size	  and	  social	  learning	  frequency	  were	  not	  correlated	  with	  each	  other	  indicating	  an	  absence	  of	  strong	  support	  for	  the	  social	  intelligence	  hypothesis.	  	  Instead	  they	  suggested	  that	  their	  data	  supported	  ecological	  hypotheses	  and	  the	  “technical	  intelligence”	  hypothesis,	  which	  posits	  that	  technical	  skills	  drove	  primate	  cognitive	  evolution.	  	  Their	  support	  for	  the	  technical	  intelligence	  hypothesis	  stems	  from	  their	  finding	  of	  a	  correlation	  between	  incidences	  of	  tool	  use	  and	  executive	  brain	  ratio	  (Reader	  &	  Laland	  2002).	  	  These	  hypotheses	  also	  rest	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  number	  of	  ecological	  factors	  such	  as	  diet	  are	  positively	  correlated	  with	  brain	  volume	  (Holekamp	  2006).	  	  However	  a	  large	  and	  growing	  body	  of	  evidence	  continues	  to	  provide	  support	  for	  the	  social	  intelligence	  hypothesis.	  	  	  
Social	  hypotheses	  	  	  	   Humphrey	  (1976)	  argued	  that	  cognitive	  abilities	  evolved	  in	  response	  to	  social	  complexities.	  	  He	  posited	  that	  when	  competing	  with	  conspecifics	  for	  access	  to	  mates	  selection	  will	  always	  favor	  individuals	  who	  can	  outcompete	  or	  outwit	  their	  competitors	  in	  essence	  creating	  and	  “evolutionary	  ratchet”.	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  many	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traditional	  ecological	  hypotheses	  and	  in	  the	  line	  of	  support	  of	  Humphrey,	  Byrne	  and	  Whiten	  (1989)	  proposed	  the	  Machiavellian	  Intelligence	  Hypothesis.	  	  This	  hypothesis	  states	  that	  intelligence	  likely	  evolved	  as	  an	  adaptation	  to	  help	  individuals	  navigate	  the	  complex	  demands	  of	  living	  in	  a	  group	  such	  as	  cooperating	  or	  competing	  with	  conspecifics	  (Byrne	  &	  Whiten	  1989).	  	  Since	  that	  time	  the	  theories	  emphasizing	  the	  social	  component	  of	  evolving	  intelligence	  have	  been	  expanded	  and	  are	  now	  commonly	  grouped	  under	  the	  social	  brain	  hypothesis	  (Dunbar	  &	  Schultz	  2007).	  	  In	  support	  for	  the	  social	  brain	  hypothesis,	  many	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  various	  measures	  of	  brain	  size	  correlate	  robustly	  with	  measures	  of	  group	  size	  across	  primates.	  For	  example	  larger	  brain	  size	  is	  correlated	  with	  frequency	  of	  social	  learning	  (Reader	  &	  Laland	  2002),	  prevalence	  of	  social	  play	  (Lewis	  2000),	  frequency	  of	  tactical	  deception	  (Byrne	  &	  Corp	  2004),	  frequency	  of	  coalitions	  (Dunbar	  &	  Schultz	  2007),	  grooming	  group	  size	  (Kudo	  &	  Dunbar	  2001),	  number	  of	  females	  (Lindenfors	  2005),	  and	  social	  group	  size	  (Dunbar	  1992).	  	  Furthermore	  Silk	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  demonstrated	  a	  direct	  link	  between	  sociality	  and	  reproductive	  success	  by	  showing	  that	  more	  social	  females	  experienced	  greater	  reproductive	  success	  than	  less	  social	  females.	  	  Sociality	  has	  clearly	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  primate	  cognition	  as	  it	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  primates	  have	  evolved	  in	  response	  to	  increasing	  social	  complexities.	  	  
Adaptation	  or	  a	  byproduct	  of	  selection	  	  	  	   Beyond	  the	  debate	  over	  whether	  increasing	  complexity	  in	  primate	  cognition	  arose	  as	  a	  result	  of	  ecological	  or	  social	  challenges	  there	  is	  also	  a	  debate	  over	  whether	  the	  specific	  aspects	  of	  cognition	  we	  study	  arose	  as	  their	  own	  adaptations	  or	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as	  a	  byproduct	  of	  selection	  for	  other	  more	  general	  traits.	  For	  example	  in	  the	  infamous	  Siberian	  fox	  experiments	  researchers	  selectively	  bred	  foxes	  based	  on	  whether	  they	  fearlessly	  and	  non-­‐aggressively	  approached	  a	  human.	  	  This	  trait	  in	  this	  artificial	  context	  could	  be	  considered	  the	  adaptation	  but	  unexpectedly	  these	  “friendlier”	  foxes	  also	  had	  higher	  incidences	  of	  floppy	  ears,	  depigmentation	  of	  hair,	  and	  short	  or	  curly	  tails	  among	  other	  things	  (Hare	  &	  Tomasello	  2005).	  	  All	  of	  these	  additional	  factors	  were	  byproducts	  of	  selection	  for	  fearlessness	  and	  nonaggression.	  	  Although	  in	  this	  artificial	  context	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  separate	  the	  two	  this	  is	  less	  true	  in	  regard	  to	  already	  developed	  traits.	  	  This	  challenge	  can	  also	  be	  conceptualized	  in	  terms	  of	  domain	  specificity,	  which	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  adaptations	  evolve	  to	  solve	  problems	  in	  particular	  domains,	  and	  therefore	  are	  less	  well	  suited	  to	  solve	  problems	  in	  other	  domains.	  	  For	  example	  if	  a	  trait	  is	  domain	  general	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  pressures	  selected	  for	  the	  trait's	  evolution,	  but	  if	  it's	  domain	  specific	  then	  it	  should	  be	  shaped	  by	  selective	  pressures	  associated	  with	  that	  domain.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  third	  possibility	  that	  it	  was	  originally	  domain	  specific	  but	  later	  co-­‐opted.	  	  In	  this	  scenario	  it	  would	  be	  initially	  built	  for	  nonsocial	  purposes	  by	  nonsocial	  selective	  pressures	  and	  only	  later	  co-­‐opted	  for	  social	  functions	  by	  social	  pressures.	  	  It	  can	  be	  challenging	  to	  discriminate	  between	  these	  varying	  scenarios.	  	  Chiappe	  and	  MacDonald	  (2010)	  argue	  that	  domain	  general	  mechanisms	  are	  an	  important	  component	  of	  cognition	  because	  they	  allow	  individuals	  to	  confront	  the	  fundamental	  problem	  of	  new	  challenges	  that	  arise	  as	  a	  result	  of	  continually	  changing	  and	  fluctuating	  environments.	  	  	  
Transitive	  inference	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  Understanding	  the	  relationship	  among	  various	  entities,	  whether	  they	  be	  social	  agents,	  tools	  or	  food,	  can	  be	  important	  for	  prioritizing	  actions	  and	  choices.	  	  Transitive	  inference	  is	  an	  inferential	  reasoning	  skill	  that	  can	  help	  individuals	  conceptualize	  the	  relationship	  among	  many	  elements	  by	  allowing	  them	  to	  compare	  previously	  unknown	  or	  disparate	  relationships.	  	  Creating	  a	  mental	  hierarchy	  allows	  individuals	  to	  understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  two	  previously	  uncompared	  objects	  by	  knowing	  their	  relationship	  to	  a	  third	  object.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  in	  a	  linear	  hierarchy	  individual	  A	  is	  dominant	  to	  individual	  B	  and	  B	  is	  dominant	  to	  C	  then	  one	  can	  infer	  that	  A	  is	  also	  dominant	  to	  C.	  	  Transitive	  inference	  is	  an	  important	  cognitive	  skill	  because	  organizing	  information	  in	  a	  linear	  order	  is	  extremely	  efficient	  as	  it	  allows	  individuals	  to	  preserve	  all	  essential	  information	  and	  make	  deductions	  about	  novel	  relations	  within	  the	  series	  (Davis	  1992).	  	  It	  was	  originally	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  skill	  that	  belonged	  exclusively	  to	  humans	  but	  has	  now	  been	  found	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  species	  from	  fish	  to	  birds	  to	  nonhuman	  primates	  (White	  &	  Gowan,	  2012;	  Mikolash	  
et	  al.,	  2013;	  MacLean	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  Since	  transitive	  inference	  has	  important	  implications	  in	  both	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  domains	  it	  could	  expose	  key	  information	  about	  cognitive	  evolution.	  	  
Nonsocial	  implications	  of	  transitive	  inference	  	  	  	   Although	  there	  are	  fewer	  documented	  applications	  of	  transitive	  inference	  in	  the	  nonsocial	  domain	  it	  clearly	  could	  have	  important	  implications.	  	  Rosati	  and	  Hare	  (2012)	  conducted	  food	  preference	  tests	  where	  they	  allowed	  chimpanzees	  to	  create	  their	  own	  hierarchy	  of	  most	  to	  least	  preferred	  food	  items.	  	  Although	  there	  was	  no	  component	  of	  transitive	  inference	  this	  task	  demonstrated	  that	  chimpanzees	  can	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organize	  food	  into	  linear	  hierarchies	  as	  well.	  	  Another	  study	  found	  that	  wild	  orangutans,	  Pongo	  pygmaeus,	  make	  foraging	  decisions	  based	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  factors	  including	  patch	  size,	  level	  of	  toxins,	  and	  energy	  content	  (Leighton	  1993).	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  they	  are	  organizing	  this	  information	  hierarchically	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  best	  foraging	  decisions	  in	  terms	  of	  gains.	  	  	  	  	  
Social	  implications	  of	  transitive	  inference	  	  	  	   Throughout	  the	  literature	  there	  is	  abundant	  evidence	  citing	  the	  importance	  of	  transitive	  inference	  skills	  for	  group	  living	  (Bond	  et	  al.	  2002;	  MacLean	  et	  al.	  2008;	  Weib	  et	  al.	  2010;	  White	  &	  Gowan	  2012).	  	  For	  example	  understanding	  the	  relationships	  among	  members	  of	  a	  social	  group	  could	  substantially	  decrease	  the	  number	  of	  costly	  encounters	  an	  individual	  experiences	  (Weib	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  Furthermore	  being	  able	  to	  conceptualize	  these	  relationships	  based	  on	  indirect	  evidence	  could	  save	  individuals	  the	  energy	  and	  time	  costs	  associated	  with	  experiencing	  them	  first	  hand	  (Weib	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  As	  group	  size	  increases	  the	  number	  of	  pair-­‐wise	  encounters	  also	  increases	  dramatically	  so	  individuals	  in	  larger	  social	  groups	  would	  benefit	  most	  from	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  transitive	  inference	  to	  construct	  linear	  dominance	  hierarchies	  based	  on	  indirect	  evidence.	  	  Although	  basic	  transitive	  inference	  abilities	  have	  been	  demonstrated	  in	  a	  number	  of	  species	  (Davis	  1992;	  Weib	  et	  al.	  2010;	  White	  &	  Gowan	  2012)	  several	  papers	  have	  compared	  transitive	  inference	  abilities	  among	  closely	  related	  species	  that	  differ	  in	  their	  degrees	  of	  sociality.	  	  For	  example	  Bond	  et	  al.	  (2002)	  compared	  Pinyon	  Jays,	  Gymnorhinus	  
cyanocephalus,	  which	  live	  in	  stable	  social	  groups	  of	  50	  to	  500	  individuals	  with	  Western	  Scrub-­‐Jays,	  Aphelocoma	  californica,	  which	  live	  in	  much	  smaller	  social	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groups	  typically	  consisting	  of	  a	  pair	  of	  birds	  and	  their	  associated	  young.	  	  Beyond	  degrees	  of	  sociality	  the	  two	  bird	  species	  face	  very	  similar	  ecological	  demands	  and	  are	  even	  sympatric	  in	  much	  of	  their	  range.	  	  When	  they	  compared	  performance	  among	  the	  species	  on	  two	  cognitive	  tasks	  related	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  track	  and	  assess	  dyadic	  relationships	  they	  found	  that	  social	  Pinyon	  Jays	  outperformed	  their	  less	  social	  counterparts	  (Bond	  et	  al.	  2002).	  	  The	  Pinyon	  Jays	  learned	  to	  track	  dyadic	  relationships	  more	  quickly	  and	  accurately	  than	  the	  Western	  Scrub-­‐Jays.	  	  The	  Pinyon	  Jays	  also	  possessed	  a	  more	  accurate	  mechanism	  for	  transitive	  inference	  tasks.	  	  This	  clearly	  demonstrates	  the	  association	  between	  transitive	  inference	  and	  social	  complexity.	  	  Similar	  results	  have	  also	  been	  founded	  in	  comparisons	  among	  primate	  species.	  	  MacLean	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  compared	  performance	  on	  a	  transitive	  inference	  task	  between	  highly	  social	  ringtailed	  lemurs,	  Lemur	  catta,	  and	  less	  social	  mongoose	  lemurs,	  Eulemur	  mongoz,	  and	  found	  that	  in	  initial	  tests	  the	  ringtailed	  lemurs	  outperformed	  mongoose	  lemurs.	  In	  subsequent	  testing	  under	  a	  correction	  procedure	  designed	  to	  teach	  the	  lemurs	  about	  the	  underlying	  linearity,	  performance	  equalized	  indicating	  there	  was	  no	  fundamental	  difference	  in	  the	  two	  species	  ability	  to	  use	  transitive	  inference	  although	  the	  ringtailed	  lemurs	  were	  more	  predisposed	  to	  do	  so	  (MacLean	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  	  	  	  
Transitive	  inference	  in	  chimpanzees	  	  	  
 Gillian	  (1981)	  first	  demonstrated	  transitive	  inference	  abilities	  in	  chimpanzees,	  Pan	  troglodytes.	  	  He	  used	  a	  paradigm	  for	  testing	  transitive	  inference	  in	  which	  subjects	  are	  trained	  to	  learn	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  stimuli	  and	  once	  they	  reach	  a	  predetermined	  criterion	  level	  of	  performance	  they	  are	  then	  tested	  on	  the	  novel	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pairs.	  	  This	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  standard	  method	  for	  demonstrating	  transitive	  inference	  in	  animals	  (Allen	  2006).	  	  Gillian	  conducted	  his	  experiment	  using	  three	  chimpanzees	  and	  a	  five	  stimulus	  series	  and	  was	  able	  to	  conclude	  that	  chimpanzees	  did	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  transitive	  inference.	  	  Since	  this	  time	  no	  additional	  transitive	  inference	  tests	  have	  been	  conducted	  with	  chimpanzees	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  an	  ideal	  taxon	  in	  which	  to	  study	  reasoning	  about	  relationships	  due	  to	  their	  complex	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  environment.	  	  	   Chimpanzees	  live	  in	  a	  patrilineal	  society	  where	  males	  stay	  in	  their	  natal	  groups	  and	  females	  immigrate	  to	  new	  groups	  (Matsuzawa	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  It	  is	  characterized	  as	  a	  fission-­‐fusion	  society	  meaning	  that	  all	  individuals	  are	  rarely	  present	  in	  the	  same	  area	  at	  any	  one	  time	  as	  individuals	  often	  travel	  and	  feed	  in	  smaller	  groups	  that	  vary	  in	  size	  and	  composition.	  	  Chimpanzee	  communities	  range	  in	  size	  from	  15	  to	  150	  members	  (Watts	  &	  Wrangham	  2006).	  	  The	  size	  of	  these	  groups	  varies	  in	  part	  as	  a	  result	  of	  food	  availability	  although	  in	  general	  males	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  social	  than	  females	  who	  may	  often	  be	  alone	  with	  only	  their	  dependent	  offspring	  (Watts	  &	  Wrangham	  2006).	  	  Communities	  typically	  have	  a	  set	  territory,	  which	  is	  patrolled	  by	  bands	  of	  male	  chimpanzees	  and	  females	  tend	  to	  stay	  closer	  to	  the	  center	  in	  core	  areas.	  	  Male	  chimpanzees	  form	  linear	  dominance	  hierarchies	  and	  competition	  for	  high	  dominance	  rank	  is	  fierce	  (Watts	  &	  Wrangham	  2006).	  	  Females	  also	  have	  dominance	  relationships	  although	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  less	  rigid	  than	  males	  (Watts	  &	  Wrangham	  2006).	  	  Chimpanzees’	  large	  group	  size	  coupled	  with	  their	  fission-­‐fusion	  behavior	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  dominance	  hierarchies	  makes	  the	  ability	  to	  track	  and	  remember	  relationships	  between	  other	  individuals	  appear	  critical	  to	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survival	  and	  reproductive	  success.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Chimpanzees	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  primarily	  fruit	  eaters	  or	  frugivores	  and	  are	  therefore	  subject	  to	  variability	  in	  food	  availability	  as	  it	  changes	  both	  seasonally	  and	  interannually	  (Basabose	  2002).	  	  Their	  diets	  are	  also	  often	  supplemented	  with	  leaves,	  seeds,	  flowers,	  pith,	  bark	  and	  occasionally	  meat	  depending	  on	  the	  subspecies	  (Watts	  &	  Wrangham	  2006).	  	  	  The	  seasonal	  changes	  in	  food	  availability	  leverage	  significant	  foraging	  constraints	  on	  chimpanzees	  in	  response	  to	  which	  they	  might	  have	  developed	  more	  complex	  cognition.	  	  	  	  	  
Our	  Study	  	  	  	  	   Clearly	  there	  is	  an	  active	  debate	  as	  to	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  social	  versus	  nonsocial	  factors	  in	  shaping	  our	  cognitive	  abilities.	  	  Both	  sides	  of	  the	  debate	  are	  represented	  with	  empirical	  data	  and	  correlations	  that	  support	  their	  argument.	  	  Although	  previous	  work	  suggests	  that	  transitive	  inference	  abilities	  are	  superior	  in	  social	  species—suggesting	  that	  sociality	  has	  favored	  the	  evolution	  of	  this	  ability—no	  studies	  have	  explored	  whether	  individual	  species	  are	  better	  adapted	  to	  apply	  transitive	  inference	  to	  social	  or	  nonsocial	  content.	  We	  compared	  performance	  on	  a	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  version	  of	  a	  transitive	  inference	  task	  using	  chimpanzees.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Methods	  
Study	  Subjects	  and	  Housing	   	  We	  tested	  one	  infant	  (Nori,	  a	  3	  year	  old	  female)	  and	  three	  adult	  chimpanzees	  (Jonathan,	  an	  17	  year	  old	  male;	  Ruthie,	  a	  17	  year	  old	  female;	  and	  Maggie,	  a	  40	  year	  old	  female).	  	  	  Subjects	  were	  housed	  in	  indoor/outdoor	  enclosures	  at	  the	  North	  Carolina	  Zoo	  (Asheboro,	  NC).	  	  The	  chimpanzees	  live	  in	  typical	  social	  groups	  with	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other	  individuals	  (average	  8	  individuals	  per	  group)	  but	  were	  separated	  from	  other	  subjects	  during	  testing.	  	  None	  of	  the	  individuals	  had	  any	  prior	  experience	  in	  related	  transitive	  inference	  tasks,	  but	  all	  subjects	  were	  trained	  to	  discriminate	  four	  pairs	  of	  images	  on	  a	  touch	  screen	  apparatus	  before	  beginning	  this	  study.	  	  Subjects	  trained	  to	  discriminate	  the	  four	  pairs	  of	  images	  until	  they	  were	  minimally	  able	  to	  complete	  mixed	  pairs	  trials	  at	  or	  above	  80%	  correct.	  	  All	  testing	  was	  done	  while	  subjects	  were	  off-­‐exhibit.	  	  All	  subjects	  had	  ad	  libitum	  access	  to	  water	  and	  were	  not	  food	  restricted	  for	  testing.	  	  Subjects	  received	  fresh	  fruit	  and	  vegetables	  as	  well	  as	  monkey	  chow	  daily.	  	  All	  testing	  occurred	  in	  subjects’	  home	  enclosures	  and	  was	  voluntary:	  data	  were	  only	  collected	  when	  subjects	  chose	  to	  approach	  the	  testing	  apparatus	  and	  participate	  in	  the	  study.	  	  This	  study	  was	  approved	  by	  Duke	  University	  IACUC	  #	  A078-­‐08-­‐03.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Apparatus	  	  
	  Figure	  1:	  A	  bird’s	  eye	  view	  of	  the	  testing	  apparatus.	  	  	  Testing	  required	  subjects	  to	  make	  selections	  on	  a	  touchscreen	  monitor.	  The	  monitor	  was	  mounted	  on	  a	  mobile	  cart	  that	  could	  be	  pushed	  against	  the	  bars	  of	  the	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subject’s	  enclosure,	  allowing	  her	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  screen	  (Figure	  1).	  The	  cart	  was	  also	  equipped	  with	  a	  laptop	  that	  controlled	  the	  presentation	  of	  tasks	  on	  the	  monitor	  and	  a	  Universal	  feeder,	  which	  automatically	  delivered	  food	  (small	  cubes	  of	  fruit	  from	  the	  chimpanzees’	  daily	  diet)	  down	  a	  tube	  to	  the	  subject	  in	  response	  to	  correct	  answers.	  Chimpanzees	  sat	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  front	  of	  the	  touch	  screen.	  A	  custom	  built	  VisualBasic	  program	  presented	  the	  stimuli	  in	  two	  central	  screen	  locations,	  left	  and	  right,	  and	  recorded	  subjects’	  responses.	  Subjects	  touched	  a	  small,	  central	  green	  rectangle	  to	  begin	  every	  trial.	  	  Correct	  responses	  were	  reinforced	  with	  a	  small	  cube	  of	  apple,	  a	  positive	  tone,	  a	  black	  screen	  and	  a	  short	  two	  second	  inter-­‐trial	  interval.	  Incorrect	  responses	  elicited	  a	  warning	  tone	  and	  a	  large	  white	  X	  on	  a	  red	  screen	  for	  five	  seconds	  before	  proceeding	  to	  the	  two	  second	  inter-­‐trial	  interval	  on	  a	  black	  screen.	  	  In	  addition,	  subjects	  received	  a	  squirt	  of	  juice	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  session,	  regardless	  of	  performance,	  to	  motivate	  them	  to	  complete	  entire	  sessions	  at	  a	  time.	  	  
Procedure	  	  Subjects	  were	  exposed	  to	  hierarchies	  of	  7	  images	  and	  trained,	  using	  adjacent	  pairs,	  to	  always	  pick	  the	  higher	  ranking	  of	  two	  stimuli.	  Ultimately	  during	  the	  test	  phase	  of	  the	  task,	  subjects	  viewed	  nonadjacent	  pairs	  and	  were	  evaluated	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  transitively	  infer	  the	  higher	  ranking	  of	  the	  stimuli.	  To	  determine	  whether	  hierarchical	  reasoning	  is	  adapted	  for	  social	  or	  nonsocial	  stimuli,	  subjects	  performed	  the	  task	  with	  four	  separate	  stimuli	  sets.	  Two	  sets	  were	  social	  –	  pictures	  of	  unfamiliar	  male	  conspecifics	  –	  and	  two	  were	  nonsocial	  –	  pictures	  of	  unfamiliar	  fruits.	  	  All	  of	  the	  stimuli	  were	  unfamiliar	  so	  subject’s	  previous	  preferences	  did	  not	  interfere	  with	  their	  ability	  to	  learn	  the	  presented	  hierarchy.	  	  Fruit	  was	  used	  as	  the	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nonsocial	  stimuli	  because	  it	  is	  ecologically	  relevant.	  	  All	  subjects	  participated	  in	  the	  task	  with	  each	  of	  the	  stimuli	  sets	  in	  ABBA	  order.	  We	  counterbalanced	  between	  subjects	  whether	  the	  first	  set	  was	  social	  or	  nonsocial	  and	  whether	  each	  hierarchy	  was	  organized	  from	  A	  to	  G	  or	  G	  to	  A	  to	  ensure	  that	  intrinsic	  features	  of	  the	  hierarchy	  did	  not	  influence	  performance.	  	  A	  maximum	  of	  two	  stimuli	  were	  presented	  on	  the	  screen	  and	  subjects	  were	  rewarded	  for	  selecting	  the	  higher	  ranked	  stimuli.	  	  There	  were	  30	  trials	  in	  each	  session	  and	  the	  location	  of	  stimuli	  was	  counterbalanced	  such	  that	  each	  pair	  appeared	  equally	  frequently	  in	  the	  left	  and	  right	  locations.	  	  Additionally	  subjects	  completed	  as	  many	  sessions	  as	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  in	  any	  given	  day.	  	  Twenty-­‐eight	  color	  images	  were	  used	  throughout	  the	  study.	  	  There	  were	  2	  conditions,	  social	  and	  nonsocial.	  	  For	  each	  of	  these	  conditions	  there	  were	  two	  sets	  of	  stimuli	  consisting	  of	  seven	  images	  each.	  	  Therefore,	  a	  total	  of	  14	  images	  of	  unfamiliar	  adult	  male	  conspecifics	  were	  used	  in	  social	  conditions	  and	  14	  images	  of	  unfamiliar	  fruits	  were	  used	  in	  nonsocial	  conditions.	  	  All	  subjects	  completed	  all	  four	  conditions	  in	  a	  counterbalanced	  order	  (i.e.	  ABBA	  or	  BAAB).	  	  Subjects	  could	  complete	  as	  many	  sessions	  in	  a	  given	  day	  as	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  complete.	  	  If	  a	  subject	  stopped	  participating	  for	  five	  minutes	  or	  more	  the	  session	  was	  terminated.	  	  Subjects	  learned	  hierarchal	  ranks	  involving	  stimulus	  sets	  of	  7	  distinct	  images.	  	  Unfamiliar	  conspecifics	  and	  fruits	  were	  chosen	  as	  stimuli	  so	  that	  the	  hierarchical	  relationships	  that	  were	  trained	  in	  the	  task	  did	  not	  conflict	  with	  previously	  held	  hierarchies	  involving	  our	  stimuli.	  Two	  images	  were	  presented	  on	  the	  screen	  and	  the	  chimpanzees	  were	  required	  to	  select	  the	  higher	  ranking	  of	  these	  two	  stimuli	  in	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order	  to	  receive	  a	  reward.	  	  The	  images	  were	  presented	  on	  the	  left	  and	  right	  sides	  of	  the	  screen	  and	  the	  location	  of	  the	  correct	  stimuli	  was	  determined	  randomly.	  	  We	  trained	  the	  chimpanzees	  during	  three	  distinct	  phases	  (see	  below)	  although	  the	  basic	  procedure	  remained	  the	  same	  throughout.	  	  Although	  the	  use	  of	  several	  different	  conditions,	  and	  particularly	  the	  comparison	  of	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  conditions,	  on	  a	  transitive	  inference	  task	  is	  novel,	  the	  general	  procedure	  is	  adapted	  from	  MacLean	  et	  
al.	  (2008).	  
Training	  	  The	  training	  subjects	  completed	  increased	  in	  complexity	  throughout	  subsequent	  phases	  until	  subjects	  learned	  the	  complete	  linear	  hierarchy.	  	  	  In	  the	  initial	  phase	  of	  training	  subjects	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  single	  pair	  of	  adjacently	  ranked	  stimuli	  beginning	  with	  the	  highest	  ranked	  pair	  (AB).	  	  The	  chimpanzees	  were	  required	  to	  select	  the	  higher	  ranked	  stimuli	  for	  a	  reward	  (A)	  and	  were	  then	  able	  to	  progress	  to	  the	  next	  stimulus	  pairing	  in	  the	  ordinal	  sequence	  	  (BC)	  after	  performing	  at	  or	  above	  80%	  correct	  in	  at	  least	  two	  consecutive	  sessions	  on	  a	  given	  pair.	  	  Chimpanzees	  began	  this	  phase	  of	  training	  with	  the	  AB	  pairing	  and	  progressed	  through	  all	  pairs	  in	  the	  ordinal	  sequence	  to	  the	  final	  FG	  pair.	  	  	  In	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  training	  each	  session	  involved	  presentation	  of	  two	  adjacent	  stimulus	  pairs	  (e.g.	  AB,	  BC)	  but	  each	  trial	  still	  involved	  a	  single	  pair.	  	  Each	  pair	  was	  presented	  three	  times	  per	  six	  trials	  beyond	  which	  the	  pair	  presentation	  was	  semi-­‐random.	  	  Again	  subjects	  were	  rewarded	  for	  choosing	  the	  higher-­‐ranked	  stimulus	  in	  each	  paired	  presentation.	  	  For	  example	  session	  one	  consisted	  of	  the	  AB	  and	  BC	  pairs	  in	  which	  subjects	  had	  to	  select	  A	  in	  the	  AB	  pairing	  and	  B	  in	  the	  BC	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pairing.	  	  Subjects	  advanced	  to	  the	  next	  grouping	  of	  adjacent	  pairs	  in	  the	  ordinal	  sequence	  after	  completing	  at	  least	  80%	  of	  trials	  correctly	  in	  two	  consecutive	  sessions	  and	  concluded	  this	  phase	  when	  they	  met	  criterion	  on	  the	  EF	  and	  FG	  pairings.	  	  	  In	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  training	  all	  sessions	  featured	  trials	  of	  all	  six	  adjacent	  pairs.	  Each	  pair	  was	  shown	  once	  every	  six	  trials	  but	  otherwise	  the	  order	  was	  semi-­‐randomized.	  	  Subjects	  were	  again	  rewarded	  for	  selecting	  the	  higher	  ranked	  of	  the	  two	  stimuli	  presented	  on	  each	  trial.	  	  Each	  session	  contained	  30	  trials.	  	  Subjects	  received	  66	  sessions	  of	  the	  final	  training	  phase	  before	  advancing	  to	  the	  test	  sessions.	  	  	  	  	  
Testing	  	  The	  test	  session	  consisted	  of	  30	  trials	  of	  familiar	  adjacent	  pairs	  (five	  trials	  per	  pair)	  and	  six	  probe	  trials	  of	  novel	  nonadjacent	  pairs	  (one	  trial	  per	  pair).	  	  The	  test	  always	  began	  with	  at	  least	  6	  familiar	  trials	  after	  which	  probe	  trials	  were	  interspersed	  randomly	  throughout	  the	  adjacent	  pairs	  trials.	  	  The	  probe	  pairs	  were	  presented	  once	  every	  five	  trials	  with	  at	  least	  two	  familiar	  trials	  occurring	  between	  probe	  trials.	  	  Probe	  pairs	  were	  presented	  in	  random	  order	  with	  the	  restriction	  that	  all	  pairs	  were	  presented	  once	  per	  session.	  	  As	  in	  the	  training	  phases,	  subjects	  were	  only	  rewarded	  for	  selecting	  the	  higher-­‐ranking	  stimuli	  during	  trials	  of	  familiar	  adjacent	  pairs.	  	  However,	  there	  was	  no	  differential	  rewarding	  during	  the	  probe	  trials,	  i.e.	  both	  correct	  and	  incorrect	  choices	  were	  rewarded.	  	  All	  combinations	  were	  tested	  as	  probe	  pairs	  as	  long	  as	  they	  had	  one	  intervening	  stimulus	  and	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  highest	  and	  lowest	  ranked	  stimuli	  (A	  and	  G)	  since	  these	  stimuli	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were	  conditioned	  as	  either	  always	  correct	  (A)	  or	  always	  incorrect	  (G).	  	  This	  resulted	  in	  six	  different	  probe	  pairs.	  	  Each	  individual	  completed	  ten	  test	  sessions.	  	  	  	  	  
Data	  Analysis	  	   	  
	   All	  data	  (choice	  and	  latency)	  were	  collected	  automatically	  by	  the	  computer.	  	  Descriptive	  statistics	  were	  used	  to	  compare	  performance	  between	  subjects	  for	  the	  first	  two	  phases	  of	  training.	  	  T-­‐tests	  were	  used	  to	  assess	  differences	  in	  performance	  and	  latencies	  between	  conditions	  for	  a	  given	  subject.	  	  Binomial	  tests	  were	  used	  to	  assess	  individual	  performance	  within	  a	  condition.	  	  
Results	  	  	  	   Two	  subjects	  (Jon	  and	  Nori)	  successfully	  completed	  phase	  one	  and	  phase	  two	  of	  training.	  	  Jon	  completed	  the	  social	  condition,	  which	  utilized	  pictures	  of	  unfamiliar	  conspecifics,	  whereas	  Nori	  completed	  the	  nonsocial	  condition,	  which	  consisted	  of	  images	  of	  unknown	  fruits.	  	  Jon	  completed	  23	  sessions	  to	  complete	  phase	  one	  and	  33	  sessions	  to	  complete	  phase	  two	  for	  a	  combined	  total	  of	  56	  sessions.	  	  Nori	  completed	  17	  sessions	  in	  phase	  one	  and	  26	  sessions	  in	  phase	  two	  for	  a	  combined	  total	  of	  43	  sessions.	  For	  phase	  one	  Jon	  had	  an	  overall	  average	  accuracy	  of	  74.6%	  correct	  and	  73.8%	  correct	  for	  phase	  two.	  	  For	  phase	  one	  Nori	  had	  an	  overall	  average	  accuracy	  of	  83.1%	  correct	  and	  73.7%	  correct	  for	  phase	  two.	  	  	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  1:	  Average	  accuracy	  per	  stimuli	  pair	  across	  sessions	  in	  phase	  one.	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Both	  Jon	  and	  Nori	  show	  learning	  curves	  for	  all	  stimuli	  pairs	  as	  they	  progress	  through	  session	  numbers	  in	  phase	  one	  (Figure	  1).	  	  Nori	  appears	  to	  be	  learning	  more	  quickly	  as	  she	  required	  fewer	  sessions	  to	  complete	  each	  stimuli	  pair.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Figure	  2:	  Median	  latency	  to	  choice	  broken	  down	  by	  phase,	  subject,	  and	  incorrect	  or	  correct	  responses.	  	  	  	   Median	  latencies	  were	  higher	  for	  both	  Jon	  and	  Nori	  in	  correct	  trials	  than	  incorrect	  ones.	  However,	  overall	  Jon’s	  median	  latencies	  to	  choice	  are	  lower	  than	  Nori’s	  (Figure	  2).	  	  When	  these	  data	  are	  further	  broken	  down	  by	  stimuli	  pair	  Jon	  continues	  to	  demonstrate	  faster	  median	  times	  to	  choice	  than	  Nori	  (Figure	  3).	  Nori	  has	  a	  faster	  median	  time	  to	  choice	  than	  Jon	  on	  only	  one	  of	  the	  stimuli	  pairs,	  pair	  DE.	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  Figure	  3:	  Median	  time	  to	  choice	  for	  correct	  trials	  in	  the	  criterion	  sessions	  broken	  down	  by	  subject	  and	  stimuli.	  	  
	  
Discussion	  	  	  	   In	  beginning	  this	  study	  we	  had	  three	  main	  hypotheses,	  which	  are	  as	  follows.	  	  Our	  first	  hypothesis	  was	  that	  transitive	  inference	  is	  adapted	  for	  navigating	  the	  social	  world.	  	  In	  this	  scenario	  we	  would	  predict	  that	  chimpanzees	  will	  exhibit	  greater	  performance,	  meaning	  higher	  accuracy	  and	  lower	  latency	  to	  choice,	  in	  the	  social	  condition	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  nonsocial	  condition	  and	  will	  learn	  the	  pairs	  more	  quickly.	  	  Our	  second	  hypothesis	  was	  that	  transitive	  inference	  is	  adapted	  for	  exploiting	  the	  physical	  world	  and	  in	  this	  case	  we	  would	  predict	  that	  the	  chimpanzees	  would	  perform	  better	  in	  the	  nonsocial	  version	  of	  the	  task	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  social	  version.	  	  Our	  third	  hypothesis	  was	  that	  transitive	  inference	  is	  a	  generally	  adapted	  cognitive	  skill	  and	  in	  this	  scenario	  chimpanzees	  will	  show	  similar	  performance	  on	  both	  the	  social	  and	  nonsocial	  version	  of	  the	  task.	  Our	  data	  show	  that	  in	  general	  Jon,	  who	  completed	  the	  social	  condition,	  has	  a	  faster	  median	  time	  to	  choice	  when	  compared	  with	  Nori,	  who	  completed	  the	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nonsocial	  condition.	  	  This	  finding	  provides	  support	  for	  our	  first	  hypothesis	  that	  hierarchical	  reasoning	  is	  better	  adapted	  to	  the	  social	  world.	  	  However,	  Nori	  achieved	  higher	  accuracies	  overall	  and	  advanced	  more	  quickly	  through	  training	  in	  the	  nonsocial	  condition	  than	  Jon	  did	  in	  the	  social	  condition.	  	  This	  finding,	  conversely,	  provides	  support	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  hierarchical	  reasoning	  is	  better	  adapted	  for	  the	  nonsocial	  world.	  Unfortunately	  the	  presently	  small	  sample	  size	  did	  not	  permit	  the	  use	  of	  statistics	  to	  analyze	  these	  data.	  Therefore,	  although	  we	  have	  documented	  absolute	  differences	  in	  performance	  and	  latency	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  these	  values	  are	  significantly	  different.	  Both	  subjects	  have	  a	  higher	  median	  time	  to	  choice	  when	  they	  are	  correct,	  which	  may	  provide	  support	  for	  the	  conjecture	  that	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  correct	  when	  they	  take	  the	  time	  to	  actually	  think	  about	  it	  and	  consider	  their	  choices.	  	  This	  could	  be	  important	  as	  we	  move	  forward	  with	  the	  transitive	  inference	  part	  of	  the	  research	  in	  gauging	  whether	  the	  subjects	  are	  more	  quickly	  inferring	  relationships	  in	  one	  domain	  or	  the	  other.	  	  The	  results	  presented	  here	  are	  additionally	  confounded	  by	  the	  differing	  characteristics	  of	  our	  subjects.	  First	  and	  foremost	  we	  only	  have	  two	  subjects,	  which	  makes	  statistical	  comparisons	  difficult.	  	  Second	  Jon	  is	  a	  seventeen-­‐year-­‐old	  adult	  male	  chimp	  whereas	  Nori	  is	  a	  three-­‐year-­‐old	  juvenile	  female.	  	  Jon	  is	  also	  the	  dominant	  male	  in	  his	  group	  and	  often	  appears	  distracted	  by	  group	  dynamics	  and	  encounters.	  	  Therefore,	  sex	  and	  age	  differences	  could	  have	  affected	  their	  attention	  and	  speed	  of	  learning.	  	  Sex	  differences	  in	  learning	  have	  been	  documented	  in	  wild	  chimpanzees	  (Lonsdorf	  et	  al.	  2004).	  	  Lonsdorf	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  found	  that	  female	  chimpanzees	  began	  termite-­‐fishing	  (a	  learned	  behavior)	  at	  a	  much	  younger	  age	  than	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their	  male	  counterparts	  and	  that	  in	  young	  chimpanzees	  that	  had	  already	  acquired	  the	  skill	  females	  were	  more	  proficient	  than	  males	  based	  on	  the	  number	  of	  termites	  gathered	  per	  dip.	  	  	  A	  number	  of	  future	  directions	  will	  serve	  to	  clarify	  the	  results	  presented	  here.	  In	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  transitive	  inference	  skills	  in	  chimpanzees	  it	  is	  imperative	  that	  we	  move	  forward	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  study	  outlined	  in	  the	  methods.	  	  This	  study	  is	  the	  first	  study	  of	  its	  kind	  in	  that	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  test	  different	  conditions	  of	  transitive	  inference	  in	  one	  species	  to	  see	  what	  types	  of	  stimuli	  these	  psychological	  mechanisms	  are	  best	  adapted	  for.	  	  Completing	  the	  transitive	  inference	  portion	  of	  the	  task	  will	  provide	  another	  comparison	  of	  chimpanzees’	  ability	  to	  apply	  hierarchical	  reasoning	  to	  social	  versus	  nonsocial	  stimuli.	  	  In	  addition,	  completing	  this	  task	  with	  additional	  subjects	  will	  better	  allow	  us	  to	  examine	  any	  age	  or	  sex	  related	  differences	  that	  may	  be	  affecting	  subjects’	  accuracy	  and	  latency	  when	  learning	  the	  hierarchy.	  	  Every	  one	  of	  our	  subjects	  will	  also	  complete	  a	  total	  of	  four	  conditions	  (two	  social	  and	  two	  nonsocial),	  which	  will	  give	  us	  more	  data	  and	  increased	  statistical	  power	  as	  well	  as	  allow	  us	  to	  examine	  performance	  between	  conditions	  on	  an	  individual	  level.	  	  Because	  each	  individual	  will	  complete	  two	  social	  and	  two	  nonsocial	  conditions,	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  directly	  compare	  performance	  on	  each	  condition	  type	  controlling	  for	  an	  individual’s	  tendency	  to	  pay	  better	  attention,	  learn	  more	  quickly	  or	  perform	  better	  on	  the	  task.	  	  These	  future	  directions	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  tease	  apart	  our	  three	  hypotheses	  and	  ultimately	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  role	  of	  social	  versus	  nonsocial	  factors	  in	  shaping	  primate	  intelligence.	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